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As free trade areas have proliferated and statutory tariffs 
have been dramatically reduced in recent decades, non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) to international trade have risen in 
importance. Destination-specific product standards are 
one of the major types of NTBs as they impose additional 
costs on exporters and increase the time required to bring 
a product to market. This paper examines the response 
of U.S. manufacturing firms to a reduction of this NTB 
by looking at the harmonization of European product 
standards to international norms in the electronics 
sector. Using a highly detailed dataset that links U.S. 
international trade transactions to U.S. firms and a new 
industry-level database of EU product standards, the 
author finds that harmonization increases U.S. exports 
to the EU and that this increase is due to more U.S. 
firms entering the EU market—the extensive margin of 
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trade. New entrants to the EU region are drawn mainly 
from the most productive set of firms already exporting 
to developing markets before harmonization -the 
extensive margin of trade composition. These firms are 
characterized by being smaller and less productive than 
the firms that were already exporting to the EU before 
harmonization. Furthermore, harmonization decreases 
export sales at existing exporters -the intensive margin 
of trade. These findings are consistent with a model 
featuring the role of product standards heterogeneity 
across market destinations and productivity heterogeneity 
across firms. These results suggest that working toward a 
harmonization of product rules across markets could be 
a supportive policy to encourage small and medium size 
firms’ ability to enter new export markets.International Harmonization of Product Standards and
Firm Heterogeneity in International Trade
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1``These days, it is differences in national regulations,
far more than tariffs, that put sand in the wheels of trade
between rich countries.'' The Economist, May 24
th, 1997.
1 Introduction
While numerous articles study the impact of trade liberalization in traditional trade policy
instruments, few studies analyze the eect of liberalization in Non-Tari Barriers (NTBs). This pa-
per examines the response of U.S. manufacturing rms to a reduction of an NTB by looking at the
harmonization of European product standards to international norms in the electronic sector. Het-
erogeneity of product standards across market destinations is an NTB because it imposes additional
costs on exporters to comply with market-specic product requirements. It also increases the time
required to bring a product to the market. In this paper, I provide the rst rm-level evidence of
the gains of liberalization in this NTB and decompose its impact into the dierent margins of trade.
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), signed by WTO member countries in
1995, dened product standards as \a document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for
common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes
and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory." These characteristics are
mainly safety rules but they can also include other attributes such as design, size, weight, and
energy performance. Examples of standards are safety requirements for sewing machines, measures
of electromagnetic emissions from integrated circuits, specic guards for lawn mowers, and
mechanical safety of cathode ray tubes. Although the TBT agreement encourages countries to
adopt international standards whenever possible, it also recognizes the rights of countries to adopt
measures to the extent they consider appropriate | for example, for human, animal or plant life
or health, for the protection of the environment, or to meet other consumer interests such as the
prevention of deceptive practices.
While the use of standards remains voluntary, the European Union has, since the mid-1980s,
made an increasing use of standards in support of its policies and legislation. The European Com-
mission sets compulsory regulatory goals by means of \New Approach Directives", which outline
\essential requirements" associated with the manufacturing of products. The system in place
does not, however, specify how specic objectives should be achieved. For the electronic sector,
this role is fullled by product standards issued by the European Committee for Electrotechnical
Standardization (CENELEC).1 EU member countries are obliged to adopt these standards and
1For example, the Low Voltage Directive (2006/95/EC) outlines \essential requirements" for electrical equipment
with a voltage between 50 and 1000 V for alternating current and between 75 and 1500 V for direct current. Among
other conditions, it establishes that \persons and animals are adequately protected against the danger of physical
injury or other harm which might be caused by direct or indirect contact". Consequently, CENELEC issued a
standard (EN 50371:2002) to demonstrate the compliance of low power electronic and electrical apparatus with the
basic restrictions related to human exposure to electromagnetic elds (10 MHz - 300 GHz).
2withdraw any national standard that might conict with them. If a manufacturer chooses to
produce a product according to these standards, the product carries the CE mark, which implies
compliance with the \essential requirements". On the other hand, manufacturers may use other
technical specications when manufacturing a product provided there is documentation certifying
that the product meets the \essential requirements" formulated in the Directives. Nevertheless,
anecdotal evidence suggests that the prohibitive costs of the latter option push exporting companies
to favor compliance with CENELEC standards (see, for instance, Hanson (2005) and the 2010 U.S.
Report on Technical Barriers to Trade). At the global level, the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) is the organization that prepares and publishes international standards for the
electronic sector.
To examine the impact of the trade liberalization in this NTB, I use the CENELEC-IEC agree-
ment to harmonize European product standards to international norms as a policy experiment.
The Lugano Agreement, signed in 1991, and the Dresden Agreement, signed in 1996, sought to
expedite the adoption of international standards in the EU as well as to facilitate the adoption of
EU standards internationally. This synergy has taken the number of purely European standards as
a share of all standards published by CENELEC from 50 percent in the early-1990s to 25 percent
in 2008. In this context, the decrease in the share of idiosyncratic standards is a liberalization in
an NTB to international trade.
Product standards are an important, albeit often overlooked, actor in the international trade
arena. Swann (2010) and WTO (2005) present an excellent overview of product standards in the
multilateral system and its impact on trade. The literature regarding the eect of harmonization
of standards on international trade is relatively recent. Moenius(2004) provides the rst valuable
contribution by challenging the commonly held view that country-specic standards act as a
barrier to trade whereas harmonized standards encourage trade.2 In a gravity framework, the
author uses a panel data set with data on country-specic and bilaterally standards for 471
industries in 12 OECD countries during the period 1980-1995. He nds that bilateral share
standards are favorable to trade while country-specic standards tend to hinder trade in simple
goods (including agricultural products, food, beverages, and mineral fuels) and promote trade in
complex goods (like machinery and electronics). The author then oers an explanation for the
divergent eect of country-specic standards based on the dual impact of standards in production
and trade costs: While standards may impose additional costs on exporters as it maybe necessary
to adapt products for specic markets (cost-eect), they also can reduce exporter's information
cost if they convey relevant market information which would be costly to gather in the absence of
the standard (informational-eect). Moenius (2004) results imply that the cost-eect outweighs
the informational-eect for simple products while the opposite is true for complex products. In
2Moenius' work focuses mostly in bilateral harmonization of standards rather than in international harmonization
of standards.
3subsequent work, Moenius conrms these results for the agricultural sector (Moenius (2006a))
and for the electronics sector (Moenius (2006b)). In related studies, Baller (2007) and Chen and
Mattoo (2008) study the impact of EU bilateral harmonization on third countries to conclude
that such agreements increase trade between EU members but no necessarily for developing
countries. Reyes (2011) extends this conclusion also for the case of international harmonization of
EU standards in the Electronics sector.
Inspired by Johannes Moenius' work, and in light of the recommendations from the TBT
agreement, researchers started working on the impacts of international harmonization of product
standards in trade ows. Czubala et al. (2007) is the rst study to consider the impact of
international harmonization of standards in the textiles, clothing, and footwear sector on exports
from 47 Sub-Saharan countries in Africa to the EU. They nd that internationally harmonized
standards are less trade restrictive than purely European standards. Building on this result,
Shepherd (2007) examines the relationship between international harmonization and product
variety in these sectors to nd that harmonization is associated with higher export variety,
mainly for low income countries's exports to the EU. Albeit limited by the lack of m-level
data, this paper is the rst one to explore the impact of harmonization at the extensive mar-
gin of trade. Subsequently, Portugal-Perez et al. (2010) extend the analysis of international
harmonization in more complex products. By focusing in the electronics sector, the authors
not only conrm Moenius' nding about the benign role of standardization but also nd that
international harmonization enhances exports to the EU. My paper continues this analysis
by providing, to the best of my knowledge, the rst rm-level evidence of the gains from inter-
national harmonization and decomposes them into the extensive and the intensive margins of trade.
To study the impact of EU international harmonization of product standards on U.S. man-
ufacturing rms, I develop and estimate a tractable general equilibrium model of international
trade that includes productivity heterogeneity across rms and product standards diversity across
market destinations. The model is a three-country version of the Cheney (2008) and Helpman et al.
(2008) frameworks in which I assume that two countries have dierent but equally costly product
standards (countries H and F) while the third country has less stringent product requirements
(country R). After setting out the base case scenario without harmonization, I modify the model
to allow harmonization between countries F and R and characterize the trade impact in country
H. The theory provides three testable results: First, harmonization increases the number of H0s
exporting rms to market F, the extensive margin of trade. Second, new entrants are mainly
drawn from the most productive set of H's rms exporting to country R, the extensive margin of
trade composition. These rms are characterized by being smaller and less productive than the
incumbent exporters to country F. Third, harmonization decreases export sales of H0s existing
exporters to country F, the intensive margin of trade.
4To test these results empirically I merge two newly available datasets: the Linked/Longitudinal
Firm Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD), which links individual trade transactions to rms in
the US, and the World Bank EU Electrotechnical Standards Database (EUESDB), which provides
an inventory of the stock of active standards published by CENELEC and their link with standards
issued by the IEC. The LFTTD spans 13 years from 1992 to 2004 and allows the researcher to
use information from the Censuses of Manufactures (CM) of the Longitudinal Research Database
(LRD) of the U.S. Census Bureau to pin down additional rm characteristics on a quinquennial
basis. The EUESDB covers the period 1990-2007 and classies product standards according to
the International Classication of Standards (ICS). See Bernard et al. (2009) and Portugal-Perez
et al. (2010) for a complete description of each database, respectively. A key contribution of my
analysis is the linking of rm level U.S. manufacturing data to industry level measures of EU
product standards. Since there is currently no ocial concordance mapping from ICS codes to any
product or industry classication system, I develop a concordance method between 5-digit ICS
codes and 4-digit SIC industries for the Electronic sector.
Results are largerly consistent with theoretical implications. First, I conrm that U.S. industries
with relatively high harmonization exhibit relatively high export value to the EU. Furthermore,
I show that product standards harmonization increases the probability that higher-productivity
rms enter the EU market |the extensive margin of trade. Second, I nd that this impact is more
relevant for U.S. rms that were already exporters serving developing countries than for rms
entering the export activity |the extensive margin of trade composition. Third, I show that this
impact is negative for the intensive margin of trade: the change in the value of U.S. goods that are
already exported to the EU within surviving trade relationships, e.g., the same rm exporting the
same product to Europe throughout the time span. Overall, the impact at the extensive margin
outweighs the impact at the intensive margin. The empirical ndings suggest that EU product
standards harmonization to international norms contributes signicantly to explain the export
entry patterns observed in my sample of U.S. manufacturing rms.
These results have an important policy implication. The U.S. National Export Initiative laid
down in 2010 seeks to double exports over the next ve years by enhancing small and medium
sized rms' ability to enter export markets and by actively reducing barriers to trade. The results
obtained in this paper suggest that working towards a reduction in the dierences of product re-
quirements across markets could be a supportive policy to encourage rm entry into export markets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section develops the theoretical
model. Section 3 describes the data set and presents summary statistics. Section 4 presents the
empirical strategy and report results from testing the main theoretical results. Concluding remarks
are oered in section 5. Finally, appendix 1 contains theoretical derivations and appendix 2 presents
details of the data set.
52 A Model of Product Standards Harmonization
In this section, I present a model featuring the role of product standards heterogeneity across
market destinations and productivity heterogeneity across rms. The model is a straightforward
simplication of the Chaney (2008) and Helpman et al. (2008) frameworks in which I allow the xed
cost to export to vary bilaterally in a three-country version of the model. These costs arise from
the adaptation of products and production processes to foreign standards and technical regulations.
After setting out the base case scenario without harmonization, I modify the model to allow product
standard harmonization covering two of the three countries. The impact of harmonization on the
third country is then analyzed.3
2.1 Preferences
The three markets, indexed by i 2 fH;F;Rg, are symmetric. Labor is the only factor of produc-
tion and each country is endowed with L units of labor, which is also the measure of each market.
Consumers have no taste for leisure and inelastically supply their labor at the market prevailing
wage rate. Consumers derive utility from the consumption of a continuum of dierentiated vari-
eties, indexed by !, produced under increasing returns to scale and costly trade. The preferences












i represents the mass of available goods in country i, q(!) is the quantity of variety !
consumed, and  is the elasticity of substitution between any two goods,  > 1. This specication
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where di = Ei
Pi
1  is a demand shifter parameter which is exogeneneous from the point of view of
individual supplier, Ei is total expenditure by that country's consumer, and Pi is the ideal price










Country i has a measure N of single-plant, single-product rms, each choosing to produce a
dierent variety !. I assume that a producer bears only production costs when selling in the home
3This setting is similar to Shepherd (2008) but it is more exible in the sense that I consider the equilibrium
under dierent degrees of stringency of the harmonized standard. My framework also provides testable hypothesis
on the impact of harmonization at the intensive margin of trade.
6market. The cost function is represented by l =
q
', where ' is a random unit labor productivity. If a
producer seeks to export its product to country i, it has to bear a xed cost fi (0 < fi). To sharpen
the role of heterogeneity in the xed cost to export, variable trade costs are set equal to zero.4
The xed costs to export reect the investment required to establish a production process that
manufactures goods which accord with product standards in country i. Firms face productivity
heterogeneity by assuming that ' is a random draw from a distribution g(') with cumulative
density function G(') and support ['L;'H].5 Exporters confront product standards heterogeneity
across market destinations by assuming that fR < fF and fH = fF.6 Prot maximization leads to







where w is the common wage rate hereafter normalized to one. The constant mark up pricing is
equal across market destinations due to the assumption of no variable trade costs.








where fi;jg 2 fH;F;Rg.
Due to my assumption that fii = 0 all N producers sell in country i. Following Chaney (2008)
the ownership structure of the economy is as follows: each worker owns wn shares of a global fund
that collects all the prots from all rms in the world. The fund then redistributes all prots ()







The equilibrium in each economy is given by the labor market clearing condition and the zero
cuto prots condition. The labor market clearing condition ensures that total expenditure equals
the total revenue of consumers Ei = R. Equation 5 provides the minimum productivity level below










for i 6= j.
The productivity threshold is decreasing in the demand level, dj, and increasing in the cost
4The basic insights of the model does not change if I allow 
i > 1, and 
R > 
F.
50 < 'L < 'H.
6Home country and Foreign country have dierent but equally costly product standards.
7to comply with product standards, fj. The partitioning of rms by export status within each
country is ensured by 0 < fj. Under this assumption, rms drawing a productivity draw above
the productivity cuto, 'ij, will export to country j.
Figure 1 depicts the conditional prot fuctions to export and the productivity thresholds for
the Home country. From H's standpoint, F's more restrictive trade policy makes that market
tougher for a rm to export to it for two reasons: rst, there is the direct eect of more costly
product standards which reduces a rm's prots (fR < fF); second, there is an indirect eect via
the demand level in the market dR < dF. To ensure that the productivity threshold to export is
lower for the more protectionist stance, a fact borne out in a number of studies, I assume that the
relative xed cost to export to market F is large.7 Productivity, thus, provides a natural hierarchy
of rms, with less productive rms only serving market R (OR rms) whereas more productive
rms being able to export also to market F (AF rms).
2.4 Product Standard Harmonization
Harmonization of product standards between country F and country R involves a single xed
cost, b f, that home producers now must pay in order to access all foreign markets. The mutual
recognition of standards involves a new xed cost in between the pre-harmonization levels: fR 
b f  fF. Home country does not modify the stringency of domestic product standards, therefore
the x cost to export to H remains unchanged. Since home producers now are only required to pay
a single xed cost to export to F and R, H's conditional prots from export collapse into a single
equation.








  b f (7)










The conditional prots of exporting from F and R to H, and the subsequent productivity cut-
os, are still given by equations 5 and 6, respectively. Prots to export within the harmonized
zone, b ij, and the new cutos, b 'ij, can now be written as follows.

























8where fi;jg 2 fF;Rg and i 6= j.
Product standards harmonization between countries F and R involves two opposite eects in
the Home country. On the one hand, it gives rms access to a bigger market upon the payment
of a single xed cost. On the other hand, it entails a xed cost to export which is higher than the
pre-harmonized xed cost to export to R. The relationship between these impacts determines the
consequences of harmonization.
Some OR rms, conditional on their productivity, are now able to enter the F market because
the increase in the market size outweighs the increase in the xed cost to export. The share of OR
rms that enter the F market depends on the relative stringency of the harmonized standard. If b f
is \close" to fF, only the most productive rms within the OR rms nd it protable to remain
as an exporter serving both markets (see appendix 1 for this condition). Figure 2 illustrates this
situation. New entrants to the F market are characterized by the segment [b ' 1
H ;' 1
HF ]. Con-
versely, low productivity OR rms drop export participation because the increase in the xed cost
to export osets the increase in the market size; those rms are located in the segment [' 1
HR ; b ' 1
H ].
If the harmonized standards is undemanding, meaning b f is \near" fR, then all OR rms enter
the F market (see appendix 1 for this condition). Furthermore, the more productive non-exporter
rms are now able to become exporters to F and R because the market size eect outweighs the
modest increase in the xed cost to export. Figure 3 describes this situation. New entrants to
the F market are depicted in the interval [b ' 1
H ;' 1
HF ]. New exporters are located in [b ' 1
H ;' 1
HR ]
whereas OR rms entering the F markets are situated in [' 1
HR ;' 1
HF ].
Firm entry into the foreign market has an impact on the average sale of AF rms |the
intensive margin of trade. New entrants push the the aggregate price index of market F down
and reduce the optimal quantity demanded of a given rm, see equation 2. Harmonization,
then, involves a negative impact for AF rms because it increases the competition in the foreign
market. Even though I model product standards as a xed cost to export they may also aect
the variable cost.8 If this is the case, harmonization may increase exports from AF rms due
to the reduction in the ongoing costs. As it turns out in the empirical application, the xed
cost aspect seems to be the key factor driving the trade impact of product standards harmonization.
This theoretical framework gives rise to three testable hypotheses on the impact of product
standard harmonization on third countries:
1. Product standards harmonization increases the number of H0s exporting rms to market F.
The extensive margin of trade.9
8Such as periodic testing or higher marginal costs that stem from a low scale of production. see Baldwin (2000),
Chen and Mattoo (2004), and Baller (2007).
9This result, of course, is pretty sensitive to the CES assumption. The products I study in the empirical part are
92. New entrants are mainly drawn from the most productive set of OR rms. The extensive
margin of trade composition.
3. Product standards harmonization decreases export sales at existing exporters. The intensive
margin of trade.
The model presented above is fairly exible in terms of the assumption on the level of strin-
gency of international norms in country R. Note that hypotheses 1 and 3 remain unchanged if I
assume that country F and country R have dierent but equally costly product standards to begin
with. In this case, harmonization involves a dierent composition of the extensive margin of trade
(hypothesis 2). It is represented now by entry from the most productive non-exporter rms because
they can now access both markets upon the payment of a single xed cost. Alternatively, I can
relax the assumption that country R uses international norms and get the same theoretical results.
In this scenario the only required assumption is that country R has lower xed costs to export than
country F and that harmonization entails some reduction on the cost to export to country F due
to, for example, the elimination of standards aimed to protect domestic rms.
3 Data
This analysis uses the U.S. linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD),
which links individual U.S. trade transactions to U.S. rms in the Longitudinal Business Database
(LBD)10, in conjunction with rm level information from the Censuses of Manufactures (CM) of
the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) of the U.S. Census Bureau. A key contribution of this
study is the linking of rm level U.S. manufacturing data to industry level measures of EU product
standards and their relationship with international norms. This section outlines the main features
of the datasets.
3.1 U.S. Manufacturing rms Across Industries and Time
The CM is conducted every ve years and the empirical part of this paper makes use of CM
information from 1992, 1997, and 2002.11 The unit of observation for the Census is a manufacturing
establishment, or plant, and it contains detail information on inputs and output of all establish-
ments.12 For 1992 and 1997, plants are classied at the four-digit Standard Industrial Classication
level (SIC4). In 2002, industry classication changed to the 6-digit North American Industry Clas-
ones for which dierentiation and variety is important.
10See Bernard et al. (2009) for a complete description of the LFTTD and its construction. For an extensive
discussion of the LBD see Jarmin and Miranda (2002).
11Though CM data are available for earlier periods, I cannot use them because export information on the LFTTD
is not available.
12The CM imputes input usage data for small manufactures, referred to in the data as \administrative records".
As it is customary in the U.S. microdata research |see Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010)|, these observations
are excluded from the analysis.
10sication System (NAICS6). Details of the construction of the variables can be found in appendix 2.
The empirical analysis concentrates on the Electronic sector (SIC 36). This sector was
chosen because of the availability of EU product standards data. This sector consists of 36 SIC4
Industries that ranges from vehicular lighting equipment and electric lamps to semiconductors
and transformers. Table 1 provides a description of the relative level of detail between industries.
U.S. exports to the EU in this sector represents roughly 15.0 percent of total exports to the EU
between 1992 and 2002.
Table 2 shows rms' characteristics by exporting and non-exporting rms for 1992 and 1997.13
Exporting rms are further divided into the set of rms that exports to the EU and those that
export to other markets. As expected, exporters |nearly half of the rms| are bigger than non-
exporters in terms of average value of shipments and average employment. Around half of exporting
rms are multi-plant rms. Interestingly, and consistent with the theoretical model presented in
section 2, exporters' characteristics dier in terms of the market destinations. Exporters to the
EU are bigger and export more than exporters to other markets. Finally, there is rm entry into
export markets across years, which |I argue| can be partially explained by the role of European
product standards harmonization.
3.2 Trade Costs Across Industries and Time
Measuring the extent of product standardization across export market destinations is not an
easy endeavor. I used The World Bank EU Electrotechnical Standards Database (EUESDB) to
gauge this eect and to assess the degree of harmonization of EU standards with international
norms. The EUESDB provides the rst catalog of European standards in the electrotechnical
sector14 and their relationship with worldwide standards. The database provides an inventory of
the \stock" of active standards15 issued by the European Committee for Electrotechnical Stan-
dardization (CENELEC) and their link with standards issued by the International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC). Product standards are classied according to the International Classication
of Standards (ICS) and the database covers the period 1990-2007.16 See Portugal-Perez et al.
(2010) for a full description of the EUESDB and its construction.
An important contribution of my analysis is the creation of a new set of industry level measures
of EU product standards for the Electronic sector. There is currently no ocial concordance
13I do not present data for 2002 because the change in industry classication does not allow me to observe entry
of new rms into sic4 industries for that year. This issue is not problematic for the empirical application since the
model does not predict any role for product standard harmonization in domestic rm entry and exit.
14This sector refers to electrical, electronic and related technologies. More information can be found at www.iec.ch.
15The primary variable of interest is the total number of standards with which an exporter should comply during
a particular year.
16A list of the ICS codes can be found at www.iso.org/iso/ics6-en.pdf
11mapping from ICS codes to any product or industry classication system.17 I deal with this
issue by proposing a concordance between 5-digit ICS codes (ICS5) and SIC4 industries. The
construction of this mapping involves a three-step procedure. First, I obtain the 10 digit HS
codes (HS10) within each SIC4 industry from Pierce and Schott (2009). Second, I search the
PERINORM database18 |the source dataset for the EUESDB| and tabulate the ICS5 codes
associate with the set of HS6 codes within each SIC4 industry. Third, I tabulate standards by
those ICS5 codes in the PERINORM dataset and select the ICS5 codes whose standards are
actually related to the industry into which they were classied in step two. \Terminology" or
\vocabulary" standards are not taken into account. Table 3 presents this concordance and the
description of the ICS codes within each industry.
The theoretical model suggests that the heterogeneity of product standards across market
destinations is a barrier to trade. I dene the non-harmonized share of standards for industry i
in year t (NHi
t) |a proxy for this NTB measure| as the number of CENELEC standards that
are not \identical" to an existing IEC standard as a share of the total number of standards in
each SIC4 industry. I also compute the tari rate for industry i in year t (i
t) as the weighted
average rate across all 6-digit HS products within each SIC4 industry, using EU's import value
from the U.S. as weights. For some products, taris were binding to zero by year 2000 due to
the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), which is a tari cutting mechanism enforced by
the WTO between nations accounting for at least 90 percent of world IT trade. These zero-tari
bindings were on an MFN basis and thus available to exports from any other WTO member country.
Table 4 reports average tari and non-tari trade costs across SIC4 industries for ve-year
interval from 1992 to 2002. European tari rates decline across a broad range of industries over
time in the Electronic sector. Indeed, over the entire period, taris were halved for approximately
40 percent of industries. The rate of tari declines, however, varies substantially across industries.
According to the directives laid down by the Lugano and the Dresden agreements, European
product standards have progressively been harmonized to international norms. The decline in the
non-harmonized share of standards also diers across industries. The highest reduction is among
industries producing household appliances, including cooking equipment, refrigerators, laundry
equipment, and vacuum cleaners.
In addition to being a good match to the theory, the trade costs constructed here have several
advantages. First, they are derived directly from a database used by rms to document the reg-
ulation requirements to export to the European Union. Second, they vary across industries and
time. Even with these advantages, some caveats should be noted. First, the EUESDB does not
17Blind (2010) proposes a partial concordance from ICS codes to SITC codes. However, this bridge is too aggregate
at the ICS level so individual SITC codes are mapped to a large number of ICS codes.
18PERINORM is a bibliographic database maintained by the British, French and German standard-setting bodies.
It is designated to facilitate industry access to product standards and technical regulations.
12provide information on which to base an assessment of the relative technical complexity of individ-
ual standards. Constructing such a measure requires highly specialized technical and commercial
information that is currently not available. Second, product standards might vary across products
within an industry. Mapping standards to products, however, is quite dicult and would have
to be done manually.19 Given the number of standards for electronic products this option is not
currently feasible.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I explore the rm-level relationship between changing trade costs, export
growth and rm entry decisions. I confront the model's main predictions with the data. In
particular, I estimate the impact of EU product standards harmonization on U.S. export value and
I decompose the eect into the intensive and extensive margins. Overall, the empirical ndings
suggest that EU product standards harmonization contributes signicantly to explain the export
entry patterns observed among U.S. rms.
The theoretical results presented in section 2 are robust to dierent assumptions on the degree
of stringency of international standards as well as to the level of adoption of international norms
in region R. Accordingly, in the empirical analysis, I need to dene a set of countries that use
international standards if they use product standards at all. The empirical part makes use of the
agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade where the World Trade Organization urges its members to
use International Standards whenever possible. Given the institutional capacity required to create
regional product standards, developing countries are assumed to mostly use international product
standards if they use product standards at all.20 In terms of the theoretical model, developing
countries are embedded into the R region whereas Europe and the U.S. are represented by regions
F and H, respectively.
4.1 Export Value
The existing literature has found robust evidence on the positive impact of product standards
harmonization on export volume (Shepherd (2006), Czubala et. al (2009), and Portugal-Perez et al.
(2010)). I test this result in my data by estimating a gravity-type equation where the role of rm
heterogeneity is properly taken into account. Specically, I regress U.S. export value of industry
i to country j in year t (xi
jt) on economic sizes (Yjt), distances (Dj), and my measures of trade
19A manual mapping has been implemented for the textiles sector in Shepherd (2006) and used by Shepherd (2007)
and by Czubala et al. (2009).
20I dene the developing country group as including all countries in The World Bank's high middle income and
low middle income groups. I use the classication for July 2009, which is in eect until July 2010. The list can be




t).21 I also include the fraction of U.S. rms in industry i that export to country
j in year t (Wi
jt) as a control for the self-selection of rms into export markets.22 An industry is
a SIC4 code and countries are the original EU-15 members.23 Dj is the distance between the U.S.
and country j whereas Yjt is the GDP of country j in year t. Finally, t and i are sets of year and
industry xed eects and robust standards errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level.24
ln(xi
jt) = 0 + 1ln(Dj) + 2ln(Yjt) + 3ln(i
t) + 4ln(NHi
t) + 5ln(Wi
jt) + t + i + i
jt (11)
Table 5 reports the results of estimating specication 11 from 1992 to 2004. The rst and
third column use the propensity to export25 as the dependent variable, so the sample comprises all
industry-country-year cells including those with zero trade. The second and fourth column focus
on the U.S. export value, and the sample is all observations with positive exports. Columns three
and four control for the non-random selection of observations with positive export value using the
Heckman two-stages procedure. The two stages are separately identied by the functional form and
the instrumental variable from the second-stage regression. An appropriate instrument is a variable
that is correlated with the probability of export but largely uncorrelated with the export volume.
At this high level of disaggregation, the only potential instrument is the lagged decision to export.26
I nd an important role for European product standards harmonization on both the export
value and the propensity to export: the negative coeents on NHi
t and i
t indicate that falling
trade costs are followed by an increase in the propensity to export as well as in the export value
within industry-country-year bins. Interestingly, product standard harmonization seems to be
more important than taris for the propensity to export. Henceforth, I make use of detail rm
level data to show that the impact of harmonization on trade ows is due to the entry of new
exporters |the extensive margin| rather than an increase in the export value of established
exporters |the intensive margin.
An issue to be addressed is the possible endogeneity of my measure of product standards har-
monization (NHi
t) due to reverse causality: If higher U.S. export value to the EU triggers harmo-
21Note that an increase in harmonization of standards |a reduction in an NTB to international trade| implies
a reduction in NH
i
t.
22Helpman et al. (2008) estimate W
i
jt as a predicted component from a probit regression on the propensity to
export. I compute it from the underlying rm level data. Details of the construction of the variables are in appendix
2.
23Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom.
24Year xed eects control for observable and unobservable characteristics that change across years and are common
to countries and industries; like exchange rates and other type of European trade policy tool. Industry xed eects
control for characteristics that vary across industries but not across years or across countries.
25The propensity to export is a dummy variable which is equal to one if there are positive export ows at the
industry-country-year level.
26The lagged decision to export is represented by a dummy variable that is equal to one if there were U.S. exports
in industry i to country j in the preceding period.
14nization of European standards, for instance through a political economy process, the estimators
are not longer unbiased or consistent. I argue that NHi
t is exogenous to trade ows for two reasons:
First, the decision making process to create or to harmonize an European standard does not involve
any international consultation with trade partners.27 Second, U.S. rms have raised concerns on
their inability to participate in the formation of EU standards, these claims are documented in the
2010 Report on Technical Barriers to Trade.28
4.2 The Extensive Margin of Trade
While harmonization of product standards are important to increase U.S. export value
to the EU, the theoretical model predicts that the extensive margin of trade (the number of
exporting rms) accounts for this variation (hypothesis 1). I estimate the impact of falling
trade costs on the probability that non-exporting rms to the EU become exporters to the EU
via a logistic regression on my measure of changing trade costs, rm productivity and other
rm characteristics. I use rms' information from the 1992, 1997, and 2002 U.S. Censuses
of Manufactures. I dene the change in trade costs for census year t as the log dierence in
taris over the preceding ve years (4i
t+5) and as the log dierence on my measure of prod-
uct standard heterogeneity over the preceding ve years (4NHi
t+5). These regressions are given by:
(Spec 1) Pr(Et+5 = 1) = (14i
t+5 + 24NHi
t+5 + t + i)
(Spec 2) Pr(Et+5 = 1) = (14i
t+5 + 24NHi
t+5 + 3PRt + t + i) (12)
(Spec 3) Pr(Et+5 = 1) = (14i
t+5 + 24NHi
t+5 + 3PRt + 4Zt + t + i)
(Spec 4) Pr(Et+5 = 1) = (14i
t+5 + 24NHi
t+5 + 3PRt + 4Zt + 5OR Firmt+
6OR Firmt  4NHi
t+5 + t + i)
where Et+5 is a dummy variable equal to one if a rm does not export to the EU in year t and
becomes an exporter to the EU in year t + 5; PRt is the rm's revenue based labor productivity,
and Zt is a set of additional rm characteristics. Additional rm controls include size, capital
intensity, wage level, and multi-plant dummies. In specication four, I include the dummy variable
OR rm, which is equal to one if the rm is an exporter to a developing country and not to the
EU in year t. I also include industry (i) and time (t) xed eects and cluster the standard errors
at the industry level.
Results are reported across four columns in Table 6, with the rst column focusing on my
trade costs measures and subsequent columns including additional rm characteristics. Across all
specications, I nd a positive and statistically signicant association between product standards
harmonization and the probability that a non-exporting rm to the EU becomes an exporter to
the EU across Census years. The probability of becoming an EU exporter is higher in industries
with greater harmonization of product standards. Surprisingly, EU tari changes do not aect the
27See Portugal-Perez et al. for the European institutional standard setting mechanism in Electronics.
28http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-oce/reports-and-publications/2010-0
15probability of becoming an exporter. In specication two and three, I nd, as expected, a positive
and signicant association between rms' productivity and their entry into exporting. Larger and
more capital-intensive rms are more likely to become exporters, as are multi-plant rms and rms
that pay higher wages.
In line with the theoretical model, specication four shows that being an exporter to a devel-
oping market in year t increases the probability of becoming an exporter to the EU in year t+5.
This relationship is signicant at the 1% level. I also add an interaction of product standards
harmonization with the OR rm variable to check whether responses to harmonization vary across
types of exporting rms. The sign is, as expected, negative: the probability of entry into the EU
market is relatively higher for rms that export to a developing country in the face of product
standards harmonization. Hereafter, I further decompose the impact at the extensive margin of
trade between OR rms and new exporters.
4.3 The Extensive Margin of Trade Composition
Product standards heterogeneity across market destinations in conjunction with productivity
heterogeneity across rms provides a natural hierarchy of rms entering exporting markets.
Less productive rms serve less stringent markets (OR rms) while more productive rms also
serve most stringent markets (AF rms). The theoretical model predicts that harmonization of
product standards triggers entry mainly from OR rms (hypothesis 2). To examine the potential
impact of falling trade costs on the probability that OR rms become exporters to the EU, I
start by estimating equations 12 for these two groups of rms separately. Table 7 reports the
results, the rst three columns present the specications for OR rms whereas columns 4-6 show
the estimations for non-exporting rms. Across all specications, I conrm that harmonization
increases the probability of observing a new exporter to the EU market. This eect is statistically
signicant across specication. As implied by the theory, this eect is more important for OR
rms than for non-exporting rms. Remarkably, harmonization positively aects entry decisions
for non-exporting rms. Again, taris do not signicantly aect the probability of entering the
EU market for either type of rms.
Harmonization of product standards can also inuence rms' decision to star exporting a
product to the EU. To check whether rms that export a product to a developing ocuntry are
more likely to star exporting it to the EU in response to harmonization, I estimate a logistic
regression at the rm-product level on my measure of changing trade costs, rm productivity, and
other rm characteristics across Census years. I dene Ep;t+5 as a dummy variable equal to one
if a rm exports product p to a developing country but not to the EU in year t and in year t + 5
that product is exported to the EU. These regressions are given by:
16(Spec 1) Pr(Ep;t+5 = 1) = (14i
t+5 + 24NHi
t+5 + t + i)
(Spec 2) Pr(Ep;t+5 = 1) = (14i
t+5 + 24NHi
t+5 + 3PRt + t + i) (13)
(Spec 3) Pr(Ep;t+5 = 1) = (14i
t+5 + 24NHi
t+5 + 3PRt + 4Zt + t + i)
where the variables are dened as above. Zt includes an additional dummy variable \Other EU
product", which is equal to one if that rm exports another product to the EU in year t. As above,
this regressions include year and industry xed eects and standards errors are clustered at the
industry level.
Results for three specications with an increasing number of regressors are reported in Table
8. Changes in industry-level trade costs are negatively associated with the probability that an OR
rm-product enters the EU market across census years. This relation is statistically signicant at
the 1 percent level in all specications. Results in the second and third columns indicate that labor
productivity is positively associated with the probability of entry only after controlling for other
rm attributes. As expected, the fact that a rm exports another product to the EU increase the
probability of entry.
4.4 The Intensive Margin of Trade
An important implication of the theoretical model presented in section 2 is that harmonization
decreases export sales at existing exporters in market F (hypothesis 3). I test the impact of
harmonization on the intensive margin of trade by estimating equations 11 on the export volume
of U.S. goods that are already exported to the EU within surviving trade relationships (i.e.
rm-product pairs that remain as exporters to the EU for the complete set of years of my sample).
This sample is the equivalent to the export value from AF rms in the theoretical model.
Results for the Heckman model are reported across the rst three columns in table 9. As a
way to present further evidence on the dierent impact that harmonization exerts at the extensive
margin of trade, columns fouth and ve report the results of estimating equations 11 on the export
volume constructed from the set of rm-product pairs that enter the EU market at some point
after 1992 and that remain as exporters up to 2004. In order to make this group similar to the
theoretical set of OR rms, I also require that the rst time a pair is observed in the data is when
it exports to a developing country and not to the EU region. I nd, as expected, a positive and
signicant coecient for the role of product standard harmonization in AF rms' export volume.
This conrms the negative impact that European harmonization of product standards has at the
intensive margin of trade of US exporters. Conversely, the coecient for harmonization is negative
and signicant for OR rms's export value. Consistent with previous ndings, harmonization
increases the probability of observing trade within product-country-year bins.
175 Concluding Remarks
With the decline of traditional trade barriers, dierences in product requirements across market
destinations are increasingly viewed as impediments for trade. Yet despite the growing evidence of
the negative impact of product standard heterogeneity, there is little understanding of the gains
of harmonization at the micro level. This paper provides, to the best of my knowledge, the rst
rm-level evidence of the gains from product standards harmonization and decomposes them into
the intensive and extensive margins of trade.
In this paper, I develop a heterogeneous rms model featuring the role of product standards
dierences across market destinations as country-specic xed costs to export. The model is a
three-country version of the Cheney (2008) and Helpman et al. (2008) frameworks in which I
assume that two countries have dierent but equally costly product standards (countries H and
F) while the third country has less stringent product requirements (country R). After setting out
the base case scenario without harmonization, I modify the model to allow harmonization between
countries F and R and characterize the trade impact in country H. The theory provides three
testable results: First, harmonization increases the number of H0s exporting rms to market F,
the extensive margin of trade. Second, new entrants are mainly drawn from the most productive
set of H's rms exporting to country R, the extensive margin of trade composition. These rms
are characterized by being smaller and less productive than the incumbent exporters to country F.
Third, harmonization decreases export sales of H0s existing exporters to country F, the intensive
margin of trade.
To examine the impact of product standards harmonization on the margins of trade, I use
the European agreement to harmonize product standards to international norms as a natural
experiment. This agreement was achieved thanks to the cooperation between CENELEC |the
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization| and the IEC |the International
Electrotechnical Commission| laid down in the Lugano and Dresden agreements in 1991 and 1996.
I combine this information with U.S. linked/longitudinal rm trade data and the U.S. Censuses
of Manufactures to empirically confront the results of my theoretical model for the Electronic sector.
An important contribution of my analysis is the creation of a new set of industry level measures
of EU product standards for the Electronic sector. Since there is currently no ocial mapping
between the classication of standards and any industry or product classication, I develop a
method to obtain a concordance between ve-digit ICS codes and the four-digit standard industrial
classication.
The empirical ndings largely conrm the theoretical results. First, I conrm that industries
with relatively high harmonization and high reduction in tari rates exhibit relatively high U.S.
export value to the EU. Furthermore, I show that product standards harmonization increases the
18probability that higher-productivity rms enter the EU market whereas tari rates do not aect
entry decisions. Second, I nd that this impact is more relevant for U.S. rms that were already
exporters serving developing countries than for rms entering the export activity. Third, I show
that this impact is negative for the intensive margin of trade: the change in the value of U.S.
goods that are already exported to the EU within surviving trade relationships, e.g., the same rm
exporting the same product to Europe throughout the time span. Overall, the empirical ndings
suggest that EU product standards harmonization contributes signicantly to explain the export
entry patterns observed in my sample of U.S. manufacturing rms.
These results have an important policy implication. The U.S. National Export Initiative laid
down in 2010 seeks to double exports over the next ve years by enhancing small and medium
sized rms' ability to enter export markets and by actively reducing barriers to trade. The results
obtained in this paper suggest that working towards a reduction in the dierences of product
requirements across markets could be a supportive policy to encourage the entry of small and
medium size rms into export markets.
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21Appendix 1
Proposition 1. Under product standard harmonization, the number of H's exporting rms






Proof. Suppose c 'H
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Note that the the LHS expresion is increasing in b f and reaches an upper bound of 1












b f  1, this is a contradiction. Thus c 'H
 1 < ' 1
HF .
Note that the relatively stringency of the harmonized standard determines the share of OR
rms that enter the F market. I dene b f to be \near" to fR if it meets the following condition: R
!2






b f . If this is the case, it is easy to show that b ' 1
H  ' 1
HR and all OR rms
enter market F as well as the most productive non exporting rms (gure 3). Otherwise, the
harmonized standard is said to be too stringent (\close" to fF) and only the most productive rms
within the OR rm enter to market F (gure 2).
Appendix 2
The empirical analysis uses the U.S. linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database
(LFTTD),which links individual U.S. trade transactions to U.S. rms in the Longitudinal Business
Database (LBD), in conjunction with rm level information from the Censuses of Manufactures
(CM) of the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) of the U.S. Census Bureau. The impact of
European product standards harmonization in Electronics is studied at two levels: the trade ows
level (sections 4.1 and 4.4) and at the rm level (sections 4.2 and 4.3).
At the export ow level, I identify exports of electronic products to the E.U. from U.S.
manufacturing rms in the following way: From the LFTTD, I aggregate export transaction up at
the rm-product-country-year level from 1992 to 2004. Since a product is a 10-digit Harmonized
System code (HS10) (schedule B), I merge the concordance between HS10 codes and 4-digit SIC
industries (SIC4) from Pierce and Schott (2009) and retain HS10 codes within SIC 36. Next, I
drop rms that are classied in industries outside SIC 36 in the LBD as well as exports to countries
outside the EU-15 block. Finally, I collapse export value up at the sic4-country-year level. This is
the sample used in section 4.1. In section 4.4, I use the same methodology but before collapsing
out rms in the last step, I retain the set of exports of electronic products that are exported to
the EU within surviving trade relationships (i.e. rm-product pairs that remain as exporters to
the EU for the complete set of years of my sample); this sample is the equivalent to the export
value from AF rms in the theoretical model. Section 4.2 also uses export ows from OR rms,
which is constructed by keeping the set of rm-product pairs that begin export activity rst in a
22developing country29 and then enter into the EU market.
The rm level analysis have two components. The rst component is the CM that contains
input-output information at the manufacturing establishment level for years 1992, 1997, and 2002.
For years 1992 and 1997, I collapse input-output information up at the rm level within each
SIC4 industry. Since the 2002 CM classies establishments in industries using the 6-digit North
American Industry classication system (NAICS6), I assign each establishment into the SIC4
industry it was allocated in 1997 and, then, collapse input-output information up at the rm level
within each SIC4 industry.30 The second component is the LFTTD which contains information of
the market destinations for exporting manufacturing rms.
Now, I describe the main variables and the data sources.
1. Taris: Taris are compiled through WITS from TRAINS under the HS nomenclature. SIC4
taris are weigthed averages of the underlying six-digit HS codes, using EU import value from
the U.S. as weights.
2. NH Share: The non-harmonized share of products standards is computed as the number of
CENELEC standards that are not \identical" to an existing IEC standard as a share of the
total number of standards in each SIC4 industry. Product standards information is obtained
from the World Bank EU Electrotechnical Standards Database.
3. Distance: Partner countries' great-circle distance from the United States. These data are
from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII).
4. GDP: Partner countries' GDP from CEPII.
5. Wi
jt: Fraction of U.S. rms within SIC4 industry that export to country j in year t. The
number of exporting rms comes from the LFTTD whereas the number of U.S. manufacturing
rms comes from the LBD. Since the LBD changes to the NAICS industry classication from
2002, I use a NAICS-SIC correspondence provided by the U.S. Census Bureau to obtain a
consistent measure throughout my time span.
6. Labor productivity: Ratio between total number of workers and total value of shipments
at the rm level. These data come from the CM.
Other rm characteristics are from the information contained in the Censuses of Manufactures.
29China and India are excluded.
30The underlying assumption is that establishments do not change industries from 1997 to 2002. Note that I
cannot allocate 2002 establishments births into SIC4 industries. This issue is not problematic for the empirical
analysis since the theoretical model does not predict any role of harmonization on domestic rm dynamics. I cannot
use the public available bridge NAICS-SIC bridge because single NACIS6 codes are mapped to more than one SIC4
code, which makes imposible to assign establishments into SIC4 industries.
23Figures
Figure 1 - Home prots and productivity cutos before harmonization.
Figure 2 - Home Prots and productivity cutos after harmonization I.
Figure 3 - Home Prots and productivity cutos after harmonization II.
24Tables
Table 1: Four Digit SIC Codes and Descriptions
SIC4 Description
3612 Transformers
3613 Switchgear and switchboard apparatus
3621 Motors and generators
3624 Carbon or graphite products
3625 Relays and industrial controls
3629 Electrical industrial apparatus
3631 Household cooking equipment
3632 Refrigerators and refrigerating equipment
3633 Household laundry equipment
3634 Electric housewares and fans
3635 Household vacuum cleaners
3639 Household appliances, nec
3641 Electric lamps
3643 Current-carrying wiring devices
3644 Noncurrent-carrying devices
3645 Residential Electric Lighting xtures
3647 Vehicular lighting equipment
3648 Lighting equipment, nec
3651 Radio and tv receiving sets, phonographs, record players record
3652 Phonograph records; pre-recorded magnetic tapes or wires master
3661 Telephone and telegraph apparatus
3663 Radio, broadcast, and television communications equipment
3669 Other communications equipment, nec
3671 Electron tubes
3672 Printed circuit boards
3674 Semiconductors and related devices
3675 Electronic capacitors
3676 Resistors for electronic applications
3677 Electronic coils and transformers
3678 Connectors, for electronic applications
3679 Electronic components, nec
3691 Storage batteries
3692 Primary batteries
3694 Electrical starting and ignition equipment for internal combustion engines
3695 Recording media
3699 Electrical equipment and supplies, nec
Notes: This table provides the codes and description of the 36 four digit SIC industries
included in the sample. Some names are truncated to reduce clutter.
25Table 2: Firm Characteristics by Type of Firm and Year
Number tvs Exports Employment MU rms
1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997
Firms 7,985 8,443 26.1 39.9 { { 170.4 177.6 31.6 30.0
No exporting rms 4,015 3,690 4.0 4.7 { { 44.6 41.7 12.5 9.9
Exporting rms 3,970 4,753 48.5 67.2 30.2 45.7 297.6 283.1 50.8 45.7
EU 2,722 3,108 64,1 95.9 43.7 69.5 383.8 384.8 59.1 55.9
No EU 1,248 1,645 14.4 13.0 0.5 0.7 109.6 91.1 32.9 26.4
Notes: Table breaks out the number of rms, the average total value of shipments (tvs), the average
value of exports, the average employment and the share of multi-plant rms (MU) according to the
type of rm by year. EU exporters are rms that export to the EU whereas No EU exporters are rms












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Table 4: Trade Costs by Four-Digit SIC Industry and Year
Tari Rate Share Non-harmonized
(Percent) Stds (Percent)
SIC4 1992 1997 2002 1992 1997 2002
3612 5.6 4.1 2.9 80.0 61.5 51.0
3613 4.5 3.6 2.5 65.0 54.8 47.7
3621 3.5 2.6 2.0 61.1 37.0 66.7
3624 4.8 3.8 3.1 25.0 6.7 4.5
3625 4.6 3.2 2.3 85.9 57.4 51.6
3629 4.9 3.8 0.0 27.3 67.3 68.1
3631 4.7 3.5 2.7 98.0 49.4 31.4
3632 3.0 2.3 1.8 98.0 49.4 31.4
3633 4.4 3.2 2.2 94.4 51.4 37.5
3634 5.2 3.7 2.7 95.2 40.2 29.8
3635 4.3 2.9 2.2 95.2 61.5 39.5
3639 4.8 3.4 2.4 94.0 60.2 46.2
3641 5.1 3.6 2.6 50.7 34.2 29.5
3643 4.5 3.5 2.0 53.3 41.4 40.0
3644 5.9 4.9 2.9 25.4 24.2 22.0
3645 0.0 4.9 3.7 50.7 34.2 29.5
3647 4.9 3.5 2.7 50.7 34.2 29.5
3648 5.8 4.4 3.5 50.7 34.2 29.5
3651 8.3 7.1 6.0 22.2 22.7 21.3
3652 3.2 4.1 2.7 10.5 6.5 9.0
3661 7.3 6.9 0.5 15.0 11.7 10.4
3663 3.8 5.3 3.3 14.8 19.0 14.0
3669 4.2 2.8 1.6 10.5 6.5 9.0
3671 7.8 5.0 4.0 75.0 69.2 69.2
3672 6.2 5.2 0.0 45.7 42.3 38.9
3674 10.9 6.6 0.0 100.0 96.9 53.3
3675 5.8 4.2 0.0 27.3 67.3 68.1
3676 5.5 3.7 0.4 54.5 82.1 70.0
3677 4.3 3.9 2.5 71.4 61.3 50.9
3678 5.0 3.8 2.4 50.9 53.9 51.8
3679 6.2 4.2 1.3 100.0 100.0 66.7
3691 4.0 3.1 2.3 9.1 31.3 27.7
3692 8.9 6.2 4.5 9.1 31.3 27.7
3695 4.9 3.8 0.6 10.5 6.5 9.0
3699 4.6 3.2 2.1 44.6 48.6 39.0
Average 5.2 4.1 2.2 53.5 44.5 37.8
Notes: This table summarizes taris and the number of no har-
monized standards as a share of total standards across four-digit
SIC industries. Taris are weighted averages of the underly-
ing six-digit HS codes, using EU import value from the U.S. as
weights. The nal row is the unweighted average of all manu-
facturing industries included in the analysis.
28Table 5: U.S. Export value to the EU, SIC4-Country-Year. 1992-2004
Regressor Propensity to ln (Export value) Propensity to ln (Export value)
export dummy export dummy
Ln(Distance) -0.693*** -3.007*** -0.422*** -2.655***
(0.033) (0.086) (0.040) (0.086)
Ln(GDP) 0.311*** 0.500*** 0.200*** 0.380***
(0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009)
Ln(Tari rate) -0.035*** -0.278*** -0.002 -0.227***
(0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013)
Ln(NH share) -0.097** -0.059*** -0.034*** -0.026**
(0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.011)
Ln(W) 0.376*** 0.360***
(0.010) (0.009)




Sample Full positive export Full positive export
value value
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7020 4971 7020 4971
Estimation Probit OLS Heckman Heckman
First-stage Second-stage
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level are in parentheses.
Industry xed eects are for four-digit SIC codes. *** Signicant at the 1% level; ** signicant at
the 5% level; * signicant at the 10% level. Coecients for the regressions constant and dummy
variables are suppressed.
29Table 6: Probability of Entering the EU Market, All rms.
Regressor spec1 spec2 spec3 spec4
Change in tari rate 0.122 0.127 0.199 0.204
(0.198) (0.209) (0.209) (0.218)
Change in NH share -0.155*** -0.140** -0.145** -0.149***
(0.053) (0.057) (0.059) (0.460)












x change in NH share -0.037*
(0.019)
Year xed eects yes yes yes yes
Industry xed eects yes yes yes yes
Observations 4294 4294 4294 4294
log likelihood -1993.16 -1973.75 -1869.62 -1850.18
Notes: Firm-level logistic regression results. Robust standard errors adjusted
for clustering at the four-digits SIC level are in parentheses. Industry xed
eects are for three-digit SICs. Dependent variable indicates whether a non-
exporting rm to the EU becomes an exporter to the EU between year t and
year t+5. Regressions cover two panels: 1992 to 1997 and 1997 to 2002. ***
Signicant at the 1% level; ** signicant at the 5% level; * signicant at the
10% level. Coecients for the regressions constant and dummy variables are
suppressed.
30Table 7: Probability of Entering the EU Market, OR rms and non-exporting rms.
OR rms Non-exporting rms
Regressor spec1 spec2 spec3 spec1 spec2 spec3
Change in tari rate 0.012 -0.006 0.053 0.075 0.115 0.193
(0.253) (0.256) (0.249) (0.260) (0.255) (0.255)
Change in NH share -0.238** -0.233** -0.242** -0.143*** -0.128** -0.133**
(0.102) (0.103) (0.107) (0.052) (0.051) (0.054)
Ln(Labor Productivity) 0.118 -0.020 0.647*** 0.452***
(0.118) (0.128) (0.185) (0.119)
Ln(employment) 0.382** 0.216
(0.150) (0.165)




Multiple-Plant Firm 0.215 0.493***
(0.141) (0.168)
Year Fixed Eects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry Fixed Eects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1129 1129 1129 2153 2153 2153
Log likelihood -882.296 -867.525 -811.514 -490.385 -488.763 -466.03
Notes: rm level logistic regression results. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the
four-digits SIC level are in parentheses. Industry xed eects are for three-digit SICs. OR rms
indicate whether an exporting rm to the a developing country but not to the EU becomes an
exporter to the EU between year t and year t+5. Non-exporting rms indicate whether a non-
exporting rm becomes an exporter to the EU between year t and year t+5. Regressions cover two
panels: 1992 to 1997 and 1997 to 2002. *** Signicant at the 1% level; **signicant at the 5%
level; * signicant at the 10% level. Coecients for the regressions constant and dummy variables
are suppressed.
31Table 8: Probability of Entering the EU Market, OR rm-product pairs.
Regressor spec1 spec2 spec3
Change in tari rate -0.439*** -0.380*** -0.144***
(0.000) 0.057) (0.082)
Change in NH share -1.631*** -1.530*** -0.687***
(0.000) (0.098) (0.152)










Other EU product 0.650**
(0.135)
Year Fixed Eects yes yes yes
Industry Fixed Eects yes yes yes
Observations 4867 4867 4867
Log likelihood -1874.07 -1873.11 -1751.01
Notes: Firm-product level logistic regression results. Robust standard
errors adjusted for clustering at the four-digits SIC level are in parenthe-
ses. Industry xed eects are for three-digit SICs. Dependent variable
indicates whether a rm-hs10 pair is observed in a developing country
but not in the EU in yeat t and it is observed in the EU in year t+5.
Regressions cover two panels: 1992 to 1997 and 1997 to 2002. ***
Signicant at the 1% level; ** signicant at the 5% level; * signicant
at the 10% level. Coecients for the regressions constant and dummy
variables are suppressed.
32Table 9: U.S. Export value to the EU: AF rms and OR rms, SIC4-Country-Year. 1992-2004
AF rms' export value OR rms' export value
Regressor Propensity to ln (Export value) Propensity to ln (Export value)
export dummy export dummy
Ln(Distance) -0.356*** -2.491*** -0.915*** -1.687***
(0.054) (0.130) (0.064) (0.202)
Ln(GDP) 0.166*** 0.261*** 0.285*** -0.012
(0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.020)
Ln(Tari rate) -0.014 -0.095*** -0.031*** -0.086***
(0.009) (0.016) (0.009) (0.024
Ln(NH share) -0.046*** 0.101** -0.025*** -0.055**
(0.007) (0.023) (0.008) (0.024)
Ln(W) 0.262*** 0.016
(0.013) (0.021)
Lag export decision 2.516*** 1.654***
(0.011) (0.013)
^  -1.026*** -0.828***
(0.019) (0.017)
Sample Full positive export Full positive export
value value
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7020 4971 7020 4971
Estimation Heckman Heckman Heckman Heckman
First-stage Second-stage First-stage Second-stage
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level are in parentheses.
Industry xed eects are for four-digit SIC codes. *** Signicant at the 1% level; ** signicant at
the 5% level; * signicant at the 10% level. Coecients for the regressions constant and dummy
variables are suppressed.
33